JFK TAPE DETAILS
HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAM COUP PLOTTING IN 1963;
DOCUMENTS SHOW NO
THOUGHT OF DIEM ASSASSINATION;
U.S. OVERESTIMATED
INFLUENCE ON SAIGON GENERALS.
Washington D.C., November 5, 2003 - A
White House tape of President Kennedy and his advisers,
published this week in a new book-and-CD collection and excerpted
on the Web, confirms that top U.S. officials sought the November
1, 1963 coup against then-South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem
without apparently considering the physical consequences for Diem
personally (he was murdered the following day). The taped meeting
and related
documents show that U.S. officials, including JFK, vastly
overestimated their ability to control the South Vietnamese
generals who ran the coup 40 years ago this week.
The Kennedy tape from October 29, 1963 captures the
highest-level White House meeting immediately prior to the coup,
including the President's brother voicing doubts about the policy
of support for a coup: "I mean, it's different from a coup in the
Iraq or South American country; we are so intimately involved in
this…." National Security Archive senior fellow John Prados
provides a full transcript of the meeting, together with the audio
on CD, in his new book-and-CD publication, The White House
Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President (New York: The New
Press, 2003, 331 pp. + 8 CDs, ISBN 1-56584-852-7), just published
this week and featuring audio files from 8 presidents, from
Roosevelt to Reagan.
To mark the 40th anniversary of the Diem coup, a critical
turning point in the Vietnam war, Dr. Prados also compiled and
annotated for the Web a selection of recently declassified
documents from the forthcoming documentary publication, U.S.
Policy in the Vietnam War, to be published in spring 2004 by the
National Security Archive and ProQuest Information and Learning.
Together with the Kennedy tape from October 29, 1963, the
documents show that American leaders discussed not only whether to
support a successor government, but also the distribution of pro-
and anti-coup forces, U.S. actions that could be taken that would
contribute to a coup, and calling off a coup if its prospects were
not good.
"Supporting the Diem coup made the U.S. responsible for the
outcome in South Vietnam in exactly the way Bobby Kennedy feared
on October 29," said Dr. Prados. "Ironically, though, as the
conversation continued, he and the other doubters abandoned these
larger considerations and concentrated only on whether a coup
would succeed - nothing else mattered."
The posting today also includes the transcript of Diem's last
phone call to U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, inquiring "what
the attitude of the U.S. is" towards the coup then underway; Lodge
dissembled that he was not "well enough informed at this time to
be able to tell you."
JFK and the Diem
Coup
by John
Prados
By 1963, about mid-way through America's involvement in the
wars of Vietnam, the policymakers of the Kennedy administration
felt trapped between the horns of a dilemma. South Vietnam, the
part of the former state of Vietnam which the United States
supported, remained in the throes of a civil war between the
anti-communist government the U.S. favored and communist
guerrillas backed by North Vietnam. Government forces could not
seem to get a handle on how to cope with the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam, as the communist movement was known.
American military and intelligence agencies disputed progress in
the war. While denying journalists' observations that the United
States was slipping into a quagmire in Vietnam, the Kennedy
administration was privately well aware of the problems in the war
and tried measures of all kinds to energize the South Vietnamese
effort.
One big problem was in Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam,
with the South Vietnamese government itself. Plagued by
corruption, political intrigues, and constant internal squabbling,
the South Vietnamese were often at loggerheads. With the
Americans, whose interest lay in combating the National Liberation
Front guerrillas, the South Vietnamese promised cooperation but
often delivered very little. There were other difficulties rooted
in the way the South Vietnamese government had been created
originally, and the way the U.S. had helped organize the South
Vietnamese army in the 1950s, but these factors would not be
directly relevant to the events of 1963. (Note
1)
The Saigon government was headed by President Ngo
Dinh Diem, an autocratic, nepotistic ruler who valued power more
than either his relations with the Vietnamese people or progress
in fighting the communists. Diem had originally come to power by
legal means, appointed prime minister of the government that had
existed in 1954, and he had then consolidated power through a
series of military coups, quasi-coups, a government
reorganization, a referendum on his leadership, and finally a
couple of staged presidential elections. Diem styled South Vietnam
a republic and held the title president, but he had banned
political parties other than his own and he refused to permit a
legal opposition. From 1954 onwards the Americans had been urging
political reforms upon Diem, who repeatedly promised that reforms
would be made but never enacted any.
The autocratic style of Diem's leadership was not lost upon the
South Vietnamese, who were less and less enamored of the Saigon
leader. A major military coup against Diem had occurred in
November 1960, which he had survived only due to divisions among
the military leadership. Diem exploited these to play factions off
against each other and thus secure his own political survival. In
February 1962 disgruntled air force pilots had bombed the
presidential palace in hopes of killing Diem and forcing new
leadership, but that too did not work, as Diem at that moment had
been in a different part of the palace to the one that was
attacked. Diem reassigned military officers to improve his
security but again neglected to undertake political reforms. (Note
2)
The Kennedy administration between 1961 and 1963 repeatedly
increased the levels of its military aid to Saigon, funding growth
in the Vietnamese armed forces. The U.S. military, and American
military intelligence, focused on the improvements in the ratio of
troop strength between the government and guerrillas that followed
from force increases and argued the war was successful. Diplomats
and aid officials were more pessimistic. The CIA, ordered to make
an intelligence assessment in the spring of 1963, permitted their
view to be swayed by the military and produced a national
intelligence estimate that downplayed Diem's political weaknesses.
President Kennedy heard warnings from his State Department
officials and a rosy picture from the military, and felt reassured
by the CIA estimate. (Note
3)
White House impressions were shattered beginning on May 8, when
South Vietnamese security forces acting under the orders of one of
Ngo Dinh Diem's brothers, fired into a crowd of Buddhist religious
marchers celebrating the Buddha's 2,527th birthday. The rationale
for the breakup of this march was no more serious than that the
Buddhists had ignored a government edict against flying flags
other than the South Vietnamese state flag. Another of Diem's
brothers, the Roman Catholic archbishop for this same area of
South Vietnam had flown flags with impunity just weeks before when
celebrating his own promotion within the Church; the Buddhists may
have been encour-aged by that act to think their own actions would
be permitted as well. Suppression of this Buddhist march in the
ancient Vietnamese imperial capital of Hue led to a political
crisis, the "Buddhist crisis," that ignited Saigon throughout the
summer and fall of 1963. (Note
4)
The two brothers of Diem implicated in the Hue suppression were
not even the Saigon leader's main problem. Diem's brother Ngo Dinh
Nhu sat in the presidential palace as private counselor,
manipulator, emissary, and puppetmaster of the Saigon government.
Even more than Diem himself Nhu was regarded widely in South
Vietnam as a menace, directing Diem's political party, some of his
intelligence services, and Special Forces created under one of the
American-sponsored aid programs. Nhu took a very negative view of
the Buddhist troubles. President Diem's response to the Buddhist
crisis, once he passed beyond denying that anything was happening,
was to promise political and religious reforms, and negotiations
for a modus vivendi with the Buddhists were carried out in Saigon.
Nhu, however, encouraged the South Vietnamese leader to renege on
the agreement and, once again, Diem failed to enact any of the
political concessions that had been agreed.
Buddhist religious demonstrations came to Saigon in late May
and soon became almost daily events. On June 11 the protests
attained a new level of intensity after a bonze publicly immolated
himself at a busy Saigon street intersection as the climax of a
demonstration. Photographs of the scene startled the world, and
made the Buddhist troubles a political issue in the United States
for President Kennedy, who faced a tough problem in continuing
economic and military aid to a government so clearly violating the
human rights of its people. The CIA put out an addendum to its
previous national intelligence estimate revising its assessment of
Diem's political prospects, and State Department intelligence
circulated a report predicting major trouble in Saigon. (Note
5)
President Diem's worsening situation led him to declare martial
law in August 1963, and on August 21 Ngo Dinh Nhu used the martial
law authority to carry out major raids on the largest pagodas of
the Buddhist group behind the protests. Nhu conducted the raids in
such a way as to suggest that South Vietnamese military commanders
were behind them, and used troops funded by the United States
through the CIA to carry out the raids. Within days of the raids,
South Vietnamese military officers were approaching Americans to
inquire as to what the U.S. response might be to a military coup
in Saigon. (Note
6)
This situation forms the background to the selection of
documents included in this briefing book. The documents frame
those meetings and major instructions in which President Kennedy
was directly involved in considerations of a coup in Saigon. There
were two main periods during which these deliberations took place,
August and October 1963. The first sequence followed quickly on
the pagoda raids, the second occurred once the South Vietnamese
generals initiated a new round of coup preparations. The documents
here consist primarily of records of meetings or key cabled
instructions or reports pertinent to the coup, which would
eventually take place on November 1, 1963. (Note
7)
There were two major episodes where the American involvement in
these Vietnamese political events would be the most intense,
although the U.S. remained heavily engaged in Vietnam throughout.
We have for the most part selected documents that reflect high
level action by the United States government-meetings with
President Kennedy and his chief lieutenants. Our document
selections reflect these intense sequences, but they are drawn
from a much larger set of materials in the National Security
Archive's U.S. Policy in the Vietnam War, Part I: 1954-1968. The
first period of intense activity occurred in August 1963, when
South Vietnamese military officers initially planned to secure
American support for their coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. This period
included an incident that became very well-known in U.S.
government circles, in which State Department official Roger
Hilsman originated a cable giving the South Vietnamese generals
the green light for a coup against Diem (Document
2). Much of the succeeding U.S. activity revolved upon making
it seem that policy had been rescinded without in fact changing
it. The second high point came in October 1963, when final
preparations were made for the coup that was carried out.
In the wake of the coup against Diem and the assassination of
the Saigon leader and his brother, many observers have wrestled
with the question of President Kennedy's involvement in the
murders. In 1975 the Church Committee investigating CIA
assassination programs investigated the Diem coup as one of its
cases. (Note
8) Kennedy loyalists and 
administration participants have argued
that the President had nothing to do with the murders, while some
have charged Kennedy with, in effect, conspiring to kill Diem.
When the coup did begin the security precautions taken by the
South Vietnamese generals included giving the U.S. embassy only
four minutes warning, and then cutting off telephone service to
the American military advisory group. Washington's information was
partial as a result, and continued so through November 2, the day
Diem died. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recounts that
Kennedy was meeting with his senior advisers about Vietnam on the
morning of November 2 (see Document
25) when NSC staff aide Michael V. Forrestal entered the
Cabinet Room holding a cable (Document
24 provides the same information) reporting the death. (Note
9) Both McNamara and historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a
participant as White House historian, record that President
Kennedy blanched at the news and was shocked at the murder of
Diem. (Note
10) Historian Howard Jones notes that CIA director John McCone
and his subordinates were amazed that Kennedy should be shocked at
the deaths, given how unpredictable were coups d'etat. (Note
11)
Records of the Kennedy national security meetings, both here
and in our larger collection, show that none of JFK's
conversations about a coup in Saigon featured consideration of
what might physically happen to Ngo Dinh Diem or Ngo Dinh Nhu. The
audio
record of the October 29th meeting which we cite below also
reveals no discussion of this issue. That meeting, the last held
at the White House to consider a coup before this actually took
place, would have been the key moment for such a conversation. The
conclusion of the Church Committee agrees that Washington gave no
consideration to killing Diem. (Note
12) The weight of evidence therefore supports the view that
President Kennedy did not conspire in the death of Diem. However,
there is also the exceedingly strange transcript of Diem's final
phone conversation with Ambassador Lodge on the afternoon of the
coup (Document
23), which carries the distinct impression that Diem is being
abandoned by the U.S. Whether this represents Lodge's
contribution, or JFK's wishes, is not apparent from the evidence
available today.
A second charge has to do with Kennedy administration denials
that it had had anything to do with the coup itself. The
documentary record is replete with evidence that President Kennedy
and his advisers, both individually and collectively, had a
considerable role in the coup overall, by giving initial support
to Saigon military officers uncertain what the U.S. response might
be, by withdrawing U.S. aid from Diem himself, and by publicly
pressuring the Saigon government in a way that made clear to South
Vietnamese that Diem was isolated from his American ally. In
addition, at several of his meetings (Documents 7,
19,
22)
Kennedy had CIA briefings and led discussions based on the
estimated balance between pro- and anti-coup forces in Saigon that
leave no doubt the United States had a detailed interest in the
outcome of a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. The CIA also provided
$42,000 in immediate support money to the plotters the morning of
the coup, carried by Lucien Conein, an act prefigured in
administration planning Document
17).
The ultimate effect of United States participation in the
overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem was to commit Washington to Saigon even
more deeply. Having had a hand in the coup America had more
responsibility for the South Vietnamese governments that followed
Diem. That these military juntas were ineffectual in prosecuting
the Vietnam war then required successively greater levels of
involvement from the American side. The weakness of the Saigon
government thus became a factor in U.S. escalations of the Vietnam
war, leading to the major ground war that the administration of
Lyndon B. Johnson opened in 1965.
Note: The following documents are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and
install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Documents
DOCUMENT
1
DCI Briefing, July 9, 1963
SOURCE: John F. Kennedy Library: John F. Kennedy Papers
(Hereafter JFKL: JFKP): National Security File: Country File, box
51, folder: Cuba: Subjects, Intelligence Material.
This document shows that Director of Central Intelligence John
A. McCone briefed President Kennedy within twenty-four hours after
a South Vietnamese general first approached CIA officer Lucien
Conein. At the time multiple different plots were anticipated, at
least one of which might become active the following day (the
Tuyen plot referred to aborted, Tran Kim Tuyen was sent out of the
country as ambassador to Egypt). The CIA also here recognizes the
political significance of the Buddhist issue in South Vietnam.
DOCUMENT
2
State-Saigon Cable 243, August 24, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Meetings &
Memoranda series, box 316, folder: Meetings on Vietnam
8/24/63-8/31/63
This is the notorious "Hilsman Cable," drafted by Assistant
Secretary of state For Far Eastern Affairs Roger A. Hilsman in
response to a repeated contact between General Don and Conein on
August 23. The U.S. government position generally supported action
to unseat Ngo Dinh Nhu and if Diem's departure were necessary to
reach that goal, so be it. Hilsman's stronger formulation of that
position in this cable was drafted while President Kennedy,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara, and CIA director McCone were all out of town. Though the
cable had the proper concurrences by their deputies or staff, the
principals were converted by officials who opposed the Hilsman
pro-coup policy. Much of the rest of August 1963 was taken up by
the U.S. government trying to take back the coup support expressed
in this cable while, out of concern for the U.S. image with the
South Vietnamese generals, without seeming to do so.
DOCUMENT
3
Memorandum of Conversation, "Vietnam," August
26, 1963, Noon
SOURCE: JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers, Country Series, box 4,
folder: Vietnam: White House Meetings 8/26/63-8/29/63, State
Memcons
The first of a series of records of meetings in which President
John F. Kennedy and his lieutenants consider the implications of a
coup and the difficulties of bringing off a successful one.
DOCUMENT
4
Memorandum for the President, August 27, 1963
SOURCE; JFKL: John Newman Papers, Notebook, August 24-31,
1963.
National Security Council staffer Michael V. Forrestal sends a
memo to President Kennedy advising on what he may expect to hear
at the meeting on Vietnam policy scheduled for that afternoon.
DOCUMENT
5
Memorandum of Conversation, "Vietnam," August
27, 1963, 4:00PM
SOURCE: JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers, Country Series, box 4,
folder: Vietnam: White House Meetings 8/26/63-8/29/63, State
Memcons
President Kennedy continues his consideration of a policy of
support for a coup in Saigon, this time with the participation of
recently-returned ambassador to Saigon Frederick C. Nolting. The
former ambassador opposes any coup in Saigon but frankly admits
that the prospects for a coup depend upon the U.S. attitude.
Secretary Rusk argues that Nolting's recommendations are
inadequate. Kennedy orders Assistant Secretary Hilsman to prepare
a study of the contingency options. This is the State Department
record of the meeting.
DOCUMENT
6
Memorandum of Conference with the President,
August 27, 1963, 4:00 PM
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File, Meetings &
Memoranda series, box 316, folder: Meetings on Vietnam
8/24/63-8/31/63
A different record of the same Vietnam policy meeting, one
compiled by the National Security Council (NSC) staff, reports
more fully on comments by CIA's William Colby, Secretary McNamara,
Roger Hilsman, McGeorge Bundy and others.
DOCUMENT
7
Memorandum of Conversation, "Vietnam," August
28, 1963, Noon
SOURCE: JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers, Country Series, box 4,
folder: Vietnam: White House Meetings 8/26/63-8/29/63, State
Department Memcons
State Department record of the meeting on Vietnam policy, notes
continued opposition by former ambassador Nolting, interventions
by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of State
W. Averell Harriman, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon,
and others. There is discussion of the status of coup forces as
well as U.S. military moves. The meeting ends with an
understanding the White House will re-establish a policy-making
body along the lines of the "Executive Committee" created during
the Cuban Missile Crisis and that it shall meet daily. (Another,
NSC staff, record of this meeting with additional detail is
available in Foreign Relations of the United States
1961-1963, v.4, pp. 1-9, ed. John P. Glennon, Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1991.) The importance of the Vietnam
issue is further highlighted by the fact that President Kennedy is
taking the time to hold two of these policy sessions on the same
day as the massive March on Washington for civil rights by
African-Americans and others.
DOCUMENT
8
Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence
Memorandum (OCI 2703/63), "Cast of Characters in South
Vietnam," August 28, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box
201, folder: Vietnam: General, CIA Reports 11/3/63-11/5/63 [An
August document filed with November materials]
The front page of this intelligence memorandum contains notes
by McGeorge Bundy on his impressions of the discussion at the
White House meeting that day at noon. The memorandum itself is a
useful rundown on the various South Vietnamese persons involved in
the coup plots and counterplots.
DOCUMENT
9
Memorandum of Conversation, "Vietnam," August
28, 1963, 6:00 PM
SOURCE: JFKL: John Newman Papers, Notebook, August 1963
In a brief meeting following President Kennedy's encounter with
the civil rights leaders who had led the March on Washington (see
the recording of that meeting and its transcript, available in
John Prados, ed. The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the
President. New York: The New Press, 2003, pp. 69-92 and Disc 2),
the President declares that a series of personal messages from him
to U.S. officials in Saigon will be designed to elicit their views
on a coup and a general cable will furnish fresh directives.
DOCUMENT
10
Memorandum of Conference with the President,
August 29, 1963, 1200 Noon
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Meetings &
Memoranda series, box 316, folder: Meetings on Vietnam,
8/24/63-8/31/63
Policy review of the latest issues in the coup plotting in
South Vietnam, where President Kennedy asks for disagreements with
the course of action the U.S. is following. Secretary McNamara
recommends the U.S. disassociate itself from the South Vietnamese
military's coup plans, with some support from other officials,
particularly Ambassador Nolting. All agree that Diem will have to
get rid of Nhu, however. The President is told that American
official Rufus D. Phillips, a former CIA officer, has been ordered
to inform the South Vietnamese generals that Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge is behind the contacts which CIA officers are having
with them. Kennedy issues instructions, then breaks up for a
smaller meeting in the Oval Office.
DOCUMENT
11
Memorandum of Conversation, "Vietnam," August
29, 1963, 12:00 Noon
SOURCE: JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers: Country Series, box 4,
folder: Vietnam: White House Meetings 8/26/63-8/29/63, State
Department Memcons
President Kennedy explores the possibility of "an approach to
Diem" on reforms and getting rid of Ngo Dinh Nhu. However,
Secretary Rusk reports that both the U.S. ambassador, Henry Cabot
Lodge, and the military advisory group leader, General Paul D.
Harkins, are on record agreeing that the war cannot be won with a
Diem-Nhu combination at the head of the Saigon government. This is
a different version of the meeting described in Document 10.
DOCUMENT
12
State-Saigon Cable 272, August 29, 1963
SORUCE: Lyndon B. Johnson Library: Lyndon B. Johnson Papers:
National Security File: Country File Vietnam Addendum, box 263
(temporary), folder: Hilsman, Roger (Diem)
These are the instructions adopted by President Kennedy at the
White House meetings on this date. They are carefully drawn to
associate the United States with moves to oust Ngo Dinh Nhu from
the South Vietnamese government, notes that "a last approach to
Diem remains undecided," and that the U.S. will not engage in
joint coup planning though it will support a coup "that has a good
chance of succeeding."
DOCUMENT
13
National Security Council Staff-State Department
Draft, Michael Forrestal and Roger Hilsman, "Suggested Draft of
Presidential Letter Adapted to Phase I of the Plan," September
12, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers, Country File, box 4,
folder: Vietnam, September 11-20, 1963 (2)
President Kennedy's instructions in late August to Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman led to a
two-phase plan to put pressure on Diem for reforms and to dispense
with his brother Nhu. Hilsman prepared such a plan, which included
evacuation of Americans and terminating aid parts of the South
Vietnamese military. This plan was at the center of U.S.
discussions throughout much of September, but in the middle of it
Kennedy privately had Hilsman prepare a letter to Diem with the
help of Michael Forrestal of the NSC staff designed to ask Diem to
make reforms, while simultaneously reassuring the Saigon leader
and warning him that the U.S. would take actions (according to the
Hilsman pressure plan) "which make it clear that American
ccoperation and American assistance will not be given to or
through individuals whose acts and words seem to run against the
purpose of genuine national reconciliation and unified national
effort." This was a reference to Ngo Dinh Nhu. The annotations in
this draft are Roger Hilsman's.
DOCUMENT
14
State Department-National Security Council Staff
Draft, Roger Hilsman-Michael Forrestal, Potential Kennedy-Diem
Letter, September 12, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Meetings &
Memoranda, box 316, folder: Meetings on Vietnam, September 11-12,
1963
This is a clean copy of the final draft of the letter included
as Document 13. President Kennedy brought up the letter at a
national security meeting in the evening of September 11, asking
if one had been prepared as he had previously suggested. National
security adviser McGeorge Bundy tried to dissuade Kennedy from the
letter idea. The letter was prepared, however, but ultimately
rejected as too awkward and indirect (trying to get rid of Nhu
without mentioning him by name, for example). Instead President
Kennedy decided to send Robert McNamara and General Maxwell D.
Taylor on a survey trip to South Vietnam, where they could speak
to Diem privately, as well as evaluate prospects for a coup on the
ground. That trip took place at the end of September. Diem proved
unresponsive. Kennedy turned back to his pressure program.
DOCUMENT
15
Central Intelligence Agency, Untitled Draft, October
8, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: President's Office File, Departments and Agencies
series, box 72, folder: CIA, 1963.
Ngo Dinh Nhu struck back at his American enemies by using
newspapers he controlled in Saigon to reveal the name of the CIA
station chief in Saigon, John Richardson, claim there were
divisions between Ambassador Lodge and the CIA station, and that
the CIA was responsible for adverse developments in South Vietnam
since the Pagoda Raids of August. Much of this was then picked up
and reported in the press in the United States. John Kennedy had
scheduled a press conference for October 9 and in this briefing
note the CIA tried to prepare him for questions that might be
asked. Kennedy was indeed asked about the CIA in Saigon at that
news conference, and he replied, "I can find nothing . . . to
indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It
does not create policy, it attempts to execute it in those areas
where it has competence and responsibility." The president
described John Richardson as "a very dedicated public servant."
Clearly JFK kept very close to his CIA briefing note.
DOCUMENT
16
Department of State, "Successor Heads of
Government," October 25, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers, Country File, box 4,
folder: Vietnam, 10/6/63-10/31/63
Joseph A. Mendenhall, of the Far East Bureau of the State
Department, who had recently completed a survey mission to South
Vietnam at President Kennedy's request, supplies a list of
possible Vietnamese figures to head a successor government in
Saigon. Note that the list assumes a civilian government and
includes none of the military men who eventually constituted the
junta that replaced Diem.
DOCUMENT
17
Department of State, "Check-List of Possible U.S.
Actions in Case of Coup," October 25, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers, Country File, box 4,
folder: Vietnam 10/6/63-10/31/63
Mendenhall also compiles a set of options the Kennedy
administration can take in support of a coup aimed at the Diem
government. Note that he mentions providing money or other
"inducements" to Vietnamese to join in the plot. The CIA would
actually provide $42,000 to the coup plotters during the coup
itself (other amounts in support are not known).
DOCUMENT
18
National Security Council Staff, "Check List for
4 PM Meeting," no date [October 29, 1963]
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box
201, folder: Vietnam, General, Memos & Miscellaneous,
10/15/63-10/28/63
National security adviser McGeorge Bundy supplies an agenda for
the last meeting President Kennedy held with his top officials
prior to the actual coup in Saigon. Bundy suggests opening with an
intelligence briefing on the array of opposing forces, proceeding
to a discussion of whether Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge should
make an expected trip home for consultations, and ending
contingency planning for a coup.
AUDIO
CLIP
President Kennedy Meets with His National Security
Council on the Question of Supporting a Coup in South Vietnam (10
minutes 55 seconds) From John Prados, ed. The White House
Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President (New York: The New
Press, 2003, 331 pp. + 8 CDs, ISBN 1-56584-852-7)
(See Document
19 below for the official NSC staff record of this
meeting)
[NOTE: This audio clip is a Windows Media Audio file
(.wma) and should be opened using Windows Media Player]
DOCUMENT
19
Memorandum of Conference with the President,
October 29, 1963, 4:20 PM
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File, Meetings &
Memoranda series, box 317, folder: Meetings on Vietnam,
10/29/63
The NSC staff record of the discussion at the meeting that
followed from Bundy's agenda. American leaders suddenly exhibit
cold feet, starting with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy who,
as he had done during the Cuban Missile Crisis, warns against
precipitate action. Bobby Kennedy was seconded by Joint Chiefs of
Staff chairman General Maxwell D. Taylor and CIA director John
McCone. Other doubts are also expressed. The group also considered
a cable of instructions to Ambassador Lodge. (The recording and a
transcript of the discussion at this key meeting is available in
John Prados, ed. The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the
President, op. cit., pp. 97-140 and Disc 3.)
DOCUMENT
20
Draft Cable, Eyes Only for Ambassador Saigon,
October 29, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box
204, folder: Vietnam: Subjects: Top Secret Cables (Tab C)
10/28/63-10/31/63
This document is the NSC staff's draft of a cable to Ambassador
Lodge which is discussed at the meeting recorded in Document 18.
It contains instructions for the ambassador's travel as well as
arrangements for operating the embassy in a coup situation, and
material on Washington's attitude toward the coup.
DOCUMENT
21
Draft Cable, Eyes Only for Ambassador Lodge
[CIA cable 79407, noted in upper right hand corner], October 30,
1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File, box
201, folder: Vietnam, General: State & Defense Cables,
10/29/63-10/31/63
McGeorge Bundy answers a cable from Ambassador Lodge with
additional commentary flowing from President Kennedy's meeting on
October 29. Note Washington's presumption that "We do not accept .
. . that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The
discussion at the meeting and in the previous cable and this one
clearly indicate the Kennedy White House miscalculated its ability
to influence the South Vietnamese generals and their plans.
DOCUMENT
22
Memorandum of Conference with the President,
November 1, 1963, 10:00 AM
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File, Meetings &
Memoranda series, box 317, folder: Meetings on Vietnam
11/1/63-11/2/63
President Kennedy meets with his national security team
even as the South Vietnamese generals in Saigon are activating
forces for their coup. Kennedy is briefed on coup forces and on
the progress of the coup thus far, which appears to be (and is)
going against President Diem. Secretary Rusk and CIA director
McCone advise on relevant matters for U.S. action and Secretary
McNamara comments on public relations aspects of the
situation.
DOCUMENT
23
Department of State, John M. Dunn, Memorandum for
the Record, November 1, 1963
SOURCE: Gerald R. Ford Library: Gerald R. Ford Papers: National
Security Adviser's Files: NSC Convenience File, box 6, folder:
Henry Cabot Lodge, inc. Diem (2)
This document records President Ngo Dinh Diem's last
conversation on the telephone with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.
Diem asks what is the attitude of the United States toward the
coup plot and Lodge replies, disingenuously, that he does not feel
well-enough informed to say what the U.S. position actually
is.
DOCUMENT
24
Central Intelligence Agency, "The Situation in
South Vietnam," November 2, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: President's Office File, box 128A, folder:
Vietnam: Security, 1963
The CIA reports the fall of Diem and the success of the
generals' coup. The report notes that Diem and Nhu are dead, by
suicide as announced on the radio.
DOCUMENT
25
Memorandum of Conference with the President,
November 2, 1963, 9:15 AM
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Meetings &
Memoranda series, box 317, folder: Meetings on Vietnam
11/1/63-11/2/63
This is the NSC staff record of the initial high level meeting
held by President Kennedy in the wake of the Saigon coup. It was
during this meeting that NSC staffer Michael Forrestal entered the
room with news of Diem's death. Kennedy and his advisers confront
the necessity of making public comment on the death of Ngo Dinh
Diem and consider the implications for the United States.
DOCUMENT
26
Embassy Saigon, Cable 888, November 2,
1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Country File,
box 201, folder: Vietnam: General, State Cables,
11/1/63-11/2/63
The Embassy provides several accounts of what actually happened
to Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu.
DOCUMENT
27
Memorandum of Conference with the President,
November 2, 1963, 4:30 PM
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File: Meetings and
Memoranda series, box 317, folder: Meetings on Vietnam,
11/1/63-11/2/63
A follow-up meeting is held by President Kennedy in the
afternoon, as recorded in this NSC staff record. Director McCone
of the CIA argues that Washington lacks any "direct evidence" that
Diem and Nhu are, in fact, dead. There is discussion of resuming
U.S. military aid programs that had been suspended in the last
weeks of the Diem regime. Note that Kennedy's appointments
schedule for this date indicates the meeting took slightly more
than one hour. The discussion as noted in this document cannot
have consumed that amount of time.
DOCUMENT
28
CIA, "Press Version of How Diem and Nhu Died"
(OCI 3213/63), November 12, 1963
SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP:
National Security File: Country File, box 203, folder: Vietnam:
General, Memos and Miscellaneous 11/6/63-11/15/63
This document comments on what is known about the deaths of
Diem and Nhu and raises questions about some of the details that
have appeared in the press. The CIA shows (Paragraph 7) that it
still does not have an authoritative version of the deaths even
almost two weeks after the coup. Its best judgment is, however,
close to the truth (for the most authoritative account of the
killings see Nguyen Ngoc Huy, "Ngo Dinh Diem's Execution,"
Worldview Magazine, November 1976, pp. 39-42).
DOCUMENT
29
Department of State, Memorandum William P.
Bundy-Bill Moyers, "Discussions Concerning the Diem Regime in
August-October 1963," July 30, 1966
SOURCE: Lyndon B. Johnson Library: Lyndon B. Johnson Papers,
National Security File, Country File Vietnam, box 263, folder:
Hilsman, Roger (Diem 1963)
At the request of President Johnson's press secretary,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P.
Bundy sets to paper a retrospective view of the Kennedy
administration's decisions regarding policy toward Diem, the
forcing out of Nhu, and how support for the South Vietnamese coup
developed at top levels in Washington.
Notes
1. For a general overview see Stanley Karnow,
Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983.
2. See Denis Warner, The Last Confucian.
New York: Macmillan, 1963; also Anthony T. Bouscaren, The Last
of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1965. A recent reinterpretation that frames Diem
as a misunderstood reformist is in Philip E. Catton, Diem's
Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam. Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2002.
3. John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars
of CIA Director William Colby. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002, pp. 105-108.
4. See, in general, Pierro Gheddo, The Cross
and the Bo Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam. New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1970.
5. American eyewitness reports on these events
can be found in Malcolm Browne, The New Face of War. New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968; and David Halberstam, The Making of
a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era. New
York: Knopf, 1964. An important recent reconstruction of these
events through the eyes of American journalists can be found in
William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War: Young War
Correspondents and the Early Vietnam Battles. New York: Random
House, 1995. For the CIA intelligence reporting see Harold P.
Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes,
1962-1968. Langley (VA): CIA History Staff/Center for the
Study of Intelligence, 1998 (the last-named source is available in
the National Security Archive's Vietnam Document Collection).
6. Prados, Lost Crusader, pp. 113-115.
7. Specific studies of the coup against Diem
include Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in
Vietnam, 1963. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987; and, more
recently, Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the
Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
8. United States Congress, Senate (94th Congress,
1st Session). Select Committee to Study Governmental Activities
with Respect to Intelligence, Interim Report: Alleged
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1975.
9. Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In
Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York:
Times Books, 1995, p. 83.
10. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand
Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Greenwich(CT):
Fawcett Books, 1967, p. 909-910.
11. Howard Jones, Death of a Generation,
op. cit., p.426.
12. Alleged Assassination Plots, pp. 5,
223.
